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With all their nuclear shields, large enough to protect a ship, a 
city, an entire world; they could never build one to protect a single 
man. To supply light and heat to a city, they have motors six 
stories high . . . The whole war is a battle between those two 
systems; between the Empire and the Foundation; between the 
big and the little . . . [we] bribe with little things, useless in war, but 
vital to prosperity and profits. 
—Isaac Asimov, Foundation, 1951. 
1. An Introduction to Technoidealism 
 
Delivered as a trailing remark by the infamous merchant Hober Mallow to secretary Jorane Sutt, 
this epigraph exemplifies a dichotomy central to the canon of Isaac Asimov’s fiction. Ascribed by 
Mallow to an ability to create prosperity and profits through miniaturization, and thereby trade, 
these remarks broadly encompass the central conflict at the core of Asimov’s canon; conflict is 
not won by troops, fleets, or even economic dominance, it is decided instead by the invariable 
march of technology and progress—those with the greater science, prevail. Rather than holding 
this ‘basic truth’ of Asimov’s work in isolation, it is better understood in the broader context of a 
human-science relationship: how does science serve the goals of humanity, how does the 
accretion of technology relate to individuals, and how might science be a resolution to the affairs 
of human problems? The implications of this relationship are not only a feature of Asimov’s texts 
but have been central to the science-fiction canon. Born in the marvel of technological progress 
in the post-war 50’s, this notion has by and large fixated on the potential of scientific progress 
and technology to positively affect or direct change in human conditions. However, it has since 
drifted from this nascent technoidealism—as captured in Asimov—to a far more dour outlook. 
Though rooted in the scientific rationalism and technoidealism of Asimov’s 1950’s outlook, this 
element—once held as fundament—has evolved over the course of literary history to favour 
dystopia; gone are the gleaming citadels and the promise that science, and science alone, will 
“shorten the interregnum” of human suffering (Foundation 37). 
In light of this, a selection of texts spanning from Asimov’s work in the 1950’s to the 
twenty-first century help establish this philosophy of technoidealism and, in turn, demonstrates 
the shift from the origins of this ideal to the genre’s present dystopian culmination. The central 
texts in this argument are the original Foundations trilogy by Isaac Asimov: Foundation (1951), 
Foundation and Empire (1952), and The Second Foundation (1953). These novels not only 
contain a coherent expounding of the science as solution mantra but are also seminal works in 
the early science fiction canon. As this analysis is concerned with developments over time, it is 
also necessary to reference texts which demonstrate the deterioration of this ideal. In this vein, 
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are identified with a canonized shift from Asimov’s technoidealist roots toward a more 
problematized view of the relationship between humans and science. These works not only 
demonstrate a more nuanced approach to the relationship between humankind and technology, 
with the introduction of the replicant or the endorsement of fremenic living respectively but are 
participants in a process of muddling, with the transition from science as solution to science as 
suspect hinging on these seminal works. This muddling is what allows the inevitable turn from 
science-fiction’s roots, this transitory period later being cemented into scientific dystopia with the 
proliferation and rising popularity of cyberpunk, tech-noir, and related sub-genres. In this 
instance, Jeff Somers’ The Final Evolution (2011) and Iain Reid’s Foe (2018) have been 
selected as contemporary exemplars of the new and popularized discourse on the human-
science relationship: both texts fixate on the capacity for technology to displace the human 
condition. 
This abandonment signals a shift in the human-science relationship. No longer is the 
genre tied up with conceptions of technoidealism—the idea that technology creates equity, 
foments social progress, and resolves discord—it instead courts dystopia: that technology is a 
driver for class divides, ethical issues, and social discord. This overturning not only finds a 
catalyst in Dick’s Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep vis-a-vis the interactions between 
organic and synthetic life, but also in Herbert’s Dune through the dichotomy of “high technology” 
and the spiritually militant nomadism embodied by the Fremen. Somer’s The Final Evolution and 
Reid’s Foe edifies this shift through revisiting the replicant—an entity with transplanted 
intelligence and memory—and the devaluation of sapient life which follows in its wake. With this 
in mind, technological discourse in science fiction has eschewed the high-minded 
technoidealism. Rather than being embodied by this Asimovian precept, this new discourse is 
one which adopts and interrogates the moral quandaries created by rapid scientific progress; 
where science was once held as a solution, it is now little more than suspect. 
2. Foundations in Science Fiction and Technoidealism 
 
All was arranged in such a way that the future as foreseen by the 
unalterable mathematics of psychohistory would involve their early 
isolation from the main body of Imperial civilization and their 
gradual growth into the germs of the Second Galactic Empire—
cutting an inevitable barbarian interregnum from thirty thousand 
years to scarcely a single thousand. 
—Isaac Asimov, Foundation and Empire, 1952. 
 
In this vein, Lars Schmeink’s Biopunk Dystopias: Genetic Engineering, Society and Science 
Fiction will be used to analyze this temporal pivot in the aforementioned texts, whereas Krishan 
Kumar’s “The Ends of Utopia,” Alex Hall’s “‘A Way of Revealing’: Technology and Utopianism in 
Contemporary Culture,” and Jay Clayton’s “The Ridicule of Time: Science Fiction, Bioethics, 
and the Posthuman” will supplement this analysis. While Schmeink’s work offers insight and 
analysis into the core facets of the genre in its present state, Kumar’s work will centre on the 
“death” of literary utopia and provide valuable insight into the initial shift toward a non-
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moral and ethical quandaries produced by scientific progress, particularly through a 
predisposition for genetics and how the unravelling of these concerns necessarily reflect a shift 
in the literature. In effect, the underlying human-science relationship and the perception of 
technology in canonical science-fiction literature has undergone a dramatic shift since the 
1950’s. Drifting from its canonical origins with Asimov, the natal and technoidealistic 
conceptions of science as panacea have been abandoned. 
Though I have framed technoidealism as being a central element of the science-fiction 
genre, it is necessary to substantiate this and marry the concept to the existing and overarching 
scholarly framework. In the estimation of Schmeink, science fiction “is a direct interaction with 
contemporary culture that lies at the nexus of technological, scientific, critical and social thought 
in that it determines what we conceive of as possible in and for our future” (Schmeink 19-20). In 
light of this, the epigraph chosen strikes an important balance between these two notions. 
Firstly, not only has Asimov framed technology as a constituent part of this future, it also plays a 
critical role in shortening an undesired historical period. Secondly, the Asimovian canon, as 
captured in the Foundations trilogy, is not merely participant to the process outlined by 
Schmeink; it endorses a particularly positivist view of the technological and scientific aspects: if 
‘we’ are going to conceive of a possible future landscape, science is a guiding and necessarily 
utopian element that channels this possibility into a wholly positive outcome. This is what is 
meant when referring to technoidealism. Rather than positive change being enacted or derived 
through social and cultural interactions with technology or science, technology or science in and 
of themselves are guiding principles which foment social order and progress. 
Technoidealism then is merely one of many mechanisms through which standard 
utopian science fiction discourse is presented. In Schmeink’s words, “utopian [science-fiction] 
has the ability ‘to reflect or express our hopes and fears about the future, and more specifically 
to link those hopes and fears to science and technology’ (6). The interplay between hope and 
fear then is unsurprisingly omnipresent within the Foundations trilogy. This precept, embodied 
by psychohistory, is called into question by various actors who doubt the authority or the 
capacity for this science—an advanced sociological mathematics developed by Hari Seldon and 
used to chart potential futures—to adequately predict the future or serve as a means to usher in 
a purported Second Empire: “we are not here to listen to speeches, Dr. Seldon . . . Let me 
suggest to you that your predictions of disaster might be intended to destroy public confidence 
in the Imperial Government for purposes of your own!” (Foundation 32-33). Despite this 
interrogation or doubt, however, the guiding force of psychohistory remains dominant: an 
inexorable cascade of foreseen events. 
 Nowhere is this more clear than in the first novel of the trilogy which, aside from this 
introductory moment of doubt, wholeheartedly endorses the future schema laid out by Hari 
Seldon. In establishing a basis for the trilogy, Foundation outlines the basic structure of its 
psychohistorically derived future: “the future isn’t nebulous. It’s been calculated out by Seldon 
and charted. Each successive crisis in our history is mapped and each depends in a measure 
on the successful conclusion of the ones previous” (119). These calculations aren't merely 
suggestions but are a prescribed series of events demarcated by several important points of 
juncture (or crises). This sort of historical mechanism, wherein the course of humankind is 
directed, is not only part and parcel of technoidealism but bears a marked resemblance to a 
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hand. It is, in effect, an engineering of the sociological outcomes of humankind. However, it is 
eminently important to divorce the technoidealism embodied by psychohistory from its realized 
non-fictional 20th century analogues. 
Speaking to the origins of engineering human or social outcome in the science fiction 
genre, Schmeink points out that “most human engineering . . . had to content itself with 
experiments on the social scale, attempting to engineer better social bodies by ‘cultivation’ of 
specific traits and the ‘elimination’ of other, less desirable aspects” (119). While the authoritarian 
fixation on shaping or developing the human element may appear analogous to technoidealism, 
it is important to note that unlike government this idealistic quality is an unbounded one: state 
authority is subject to the tenets of technoidealism rather than technoidealism being subject to it. 
In other terms, the psychohistory of Asimov’s Foundations trilogy is not a tool employed by 
various religious or mercantile groups but exists instead as a category above them. These 
groups are not employing the disembodied statistical truths of psychohistory; they are being 
employed by them. 
 Further to this, it is important to establish the micro-level interactions of the 
technoidealistic mantra. Rather than simply existing as a guiding force or overarching principle, I 
contend that technoidealism also captures an outlook on interpersonal or micro-scale 
interactions. Specifically, a key component is the idea of science as a solution not only to 
societal level problems but also to base human-level interactions. For instance, the macro-level 
idealization of science and technology also extends to those engaged in its production: “in a 
Galaxy where the predominance—and even survival—of the Foundation still rested upon the 
superiority of its technology . . . a certain immunity adhered to The Scientist. He was needed, 
and he knew it” (Foundation and Empire 151). In effect, this idealization of technology extends 
not only to those responsible for the production of it, and thereby the advancement of 
psychohistory, but is also captured in fine-toothed interactions. Lathan Devers, a trader of the 
foundation and one of the protagonists, wins out at a critical juncture not because of guile, luck, 
or cunning, but because of the technology at his disposal. In a dramatic blunder wherein he 
attempts and fails to gain passage by bribing an Imperial Police Lieutenant disguised as a trade 
bureaucrat, Devers’ survival hinges entirely upon superior technology: “the lieutenant of police 
smiled more broadly and squeezed the contacts [of his blast-gun]. The blasting line of force 
struck Devers’ chest in an accurate blaze of destruction—that bounced harmlessly off his 
personal shield in sparkling spicules of light” (92). Rather than winning out because of any 
human element, the human element actually being what lands him in this situation, Devers 
survives due to a technological edge. Technoidealism, in effect, innately privileges social good 
by propping up scientific and technological prowess as the mechanism to rectify human 
shortcomings: it promulgates science as panacea. 
 Though technoidealism, as established in Asimov’s works, posits science as the sole 
solution, there are several recalcitrant elements that need to be addressed. In particular, the 
second novel, Foundation and Empire, hinges on a critical missing of the mark involving an 
emotion-manipulating empath called ‘the Mule.’ While members of the Foundation are 
assembled in the Time Vault to hear the next psychohistorical proclamation of Hari Seldon, his 
projection only feeds them false information: “Seldon is off his rocker. He’s got the wrong crisis . 
. . the Mule is an added feature, unprepared for in Seldon’s psychohistory” (189). This event not 





MUSe  2021 
bringing about galactic stability. However, rather than wallow in this shortcoming, the attention 
of Ebling Mis, a prominent psychologist, is swiftly directed toward an effort of rediscovery: “what 
was once the Empire is bare bones today, but something must still be at the center . . . And, 
Ebling, there’s another, greater purpose. Hari Seldon founded two Foundations . . . You must 
find that Second Foundation” (203). It is this key intervention, the existence of a second 
Foundation, which signals that this recalcitrant data point is not a refutation of technoidealism 
but, rather, an exemplification of it. It is the existence of this second Foundation in the tail end of 
the trilogy which ensures the primacy of science as solution. This Foundation, in accordance 
with this precept, signals the end of the Mule’s reign and the restoration of technoidealism 
through manipulating his emotions in turn: “when you return, you will find a revolting Empire, a 
disintegrated realm, and only the men with you in your Fleet here will be loyal to you . . . Your 
Empire is done, Mutant” (Second Foundation 137). In regards to this manipulation, this second 
Foundation has used science to expand upon the base capability of human intuition through a 
mastery of psychology—the accretion of science becoming so grand as to grant nigh-telepathic 
power: “the same basic developments of mental science that had brought about the Seldon 
Plan thus made it [unnecessary] . . . to use words . . . every reaction to a stimulus, however 
slight, was completely indicative of all the trifling changes, of all the flickering currents that went 
on in another’s mind” (111-112). It is important to note that rather than an aberrant gift, as was 
the case with the Mule, this empathic power is derived from “intensive training” and is still 
derived from scientific prowess rather than innate power (112). It is notable, however, that this 
innate power still shares the tendency of the science-fiction telepath, a figure who, as observed 
by Clayton, “[merges] individuals into a larger collective mind:” the mind being, in this instance, 
an unquestioning communion on the import of scientific achievement (325 Clayton). 
Technoidealism, then, is not only a key component of the Asimovian canon but is also the 
guiding principal force which is necessarily corrupted and eschewed in the drift toward dystopia. 
3. The Erosion of Technoidealism 
 
Black is a blind remembering, she thought. You listen for pack 
sounds, for the cries of those who hunted your ancestors in a past 
so ancient only your most primitive cells remember. The ears see. 
The nostrils see. 
—Frank Herbert, Dune, 1965. 
 
With the foundations of technoidealism established vis-a-vis Asimov’s Foundations trilogy, it is 
now prudent to look at the key texts I have identified as catalyzing works in this inter-textual 
discourse. Of particular interest is Herbert’s Dune (1965) and the manner in which it openly 
eschews elements of ‘high technology’ in favour of a lived spiritual or nomadic experience. 
Rather famously, Asimov himself has proclaimed that Dune is participatory in “a growing 
tendency to delete the science from science fiction” (qtd. Grigsby 150). However, this is not 
necessarily the case with Dune which, in fact, is much more closely aligned with Asimov’s work 
than might be expected. Much as Seldon and psychohistory are religiously revered in the 
Foundations trilogy, so too is a sort of spiritual reverence afforded to the technological products 
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harken to an abandonment of technology in favour of baser knowledge, the religious and 
ceremonial reverence afforded to water complicates such a simple understanding: “your water is 
ours, Duncan Idaho . . . The body of our friend remains with your Duke. His water is Atreides 
water. It is a bond between us” (Herbert 151). Though this passage directly refers to the actual 
water contained within a human body, this preternatural apprehension of water as a 
metaphysical bond affords a special role for Fremenic technology. It may be easy to overlook 
elements such as the stillsuit or stilltent as being little more than the markers of a nomadic 
society, but these are highly engineered devices required for survival in the harsh desert climes 
the Fremen occupy; these objects are the primary sources of water which, as established, holds 
a spiritual significance. Though they fade into the background due to their omnipresence, the 
stillsuit and like technologies are nonetheless the products of science: “it’s basically a micro-
sandwich--a high-efficiency filter and heat exchange system . . . the skin-contact layer’s porous . 
. . the next two layers . . . include heat-exchange filaments and salt precipitators. Salt’s 
reclaimed” (177). Rather than rejecting technoidealism, the presence of stillsuit technologies 
points toward a synthesis between human-oriented nomadism and science. 
There is then the matter of Paul himself who seems to abrogate this deletion of science 
wholesale. It is important to recognize that, though prophesied, Paul is the result of a carefully 
constructed hereditary plan—one which revolves around genetic selection: “you well know the 
pattern of our affairs, Jessica. The race knows its own mortality and fears stagnation of its 
heredity. It’s in the bloodstream—the urge to mingle genetic strains without plan” (Herbert 36). 
This ‘plan’ may be but a carefully guided selection of desired traits and interactions by a set of 
gatekeepers, the Reverend Mothers, to promulgate desired bloodlines, but it nonetheless 
produces gifted individuals such as the Bene Gesserit. In effect, this genetic gatekeeping and 
program of selective breeding creates the Kwizats Haderach, a figure which is more akin to 
Schmeink’s conceptions of a biologically-derived superhero than an out-and-out spiritual leader: 
“one could consequently argue that [contemporary] changes . . . such as the dissolution of 
stabilizing institutions, the continuous fluidity of identities and alliances, and the centering of 
global risks as problems to be faced by individual humans (not necessarily superpowered), find 
a correlation in the depiction of superheroes” (Schmeink 180). Though Schmeink focuses his 
argument toward a twenty-first century conception of the superhero, it is none-the-less prudent 
to note how neatly Dune’s Paul Atreides maps onto this definition. Like postmodernist biopunk, 
Dune’s Kwisatz Haderach is all about “[portraying an] ‘unlocked hidden potential within us’ as 
resultant from or contiguous with [a form of] genetic engineering” (180). 
Further to this parallel, it is important to note that the former leader of the Fremen, Liet 
Kynes, is a man of science. This reverence for scientific discipline is so great that in his dying 
moments he recalls his father’s ecological teachings and devises a scientific truth of his own: 
“then, as his planet killed him, it occurred to Kynes that his father and all the other scientists 
were wrong, that the most persistent principles of the universe were accident and error. Even 
the hawks could appreciate these facts” (Herbert 447). The Fremen then, though at a surface 
level appearing to be a nomadic and low-technologies people, are intimately involved in 
scientific processes and the fruits of scientific intervention. They are beholden to science 
irrespective of how they choose to culturally consume it: the choice of leader and the 
intercession of the stillsuit demanding as much. As a result, the death of Kynes and his final 
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technoidealist force. Science is no longer a solution in and of itself, rather it is something that 
must be culturally coded or mediated (as through a figure such as Kynes). This is significant not 
only for reframing the standard technoidealistic discourse established with Asimov, but for 
pushing against the interpretation of science alone as a guiding principle. Hari Seldon in 
Foundations may seem to occupy a mediating role, but he is merely the functionary through 
which the raw truth of psychohistory was initially delivered. Liet Kynes and Paul Atreides, by 
contrast, are fully realized and guiding human authorities. 
To complicate this further, whereas earlier technological prowess was viewed as a 
means to an end, Dune inverts this narrative by placing scientific superiority squarely in the 
hands of the novel’s antagonists; in the seminal battle of the novel, it is not technological 
prowess that decides the outcome but the intercession of the natural world via a storm: “a dust 
cloud hung low over the outside world blowing from pastel distances. Static lightning crackled 
from the cloud and the spark flashes of shields being shorted out by the storm’s charge could be 
seen through the haze” (754). In denying scientific superiority as a guiding and positive force 
whilst still paying homage to an interplay between the scientific and human elements, Dune, in 
accordance with Hall’s observations on utopia, pronounces that “technology cannot be the locus 
for utopian change by itself” (Hall 58). Rather, the shifting dynamic in Dune, with the 
reestablishment of House Atreides, eschews a technologically oriented solution and instead 
places authority back in human hands; for all the power and prowess of the Emperor and 
CHOAM, for all the opportunity afforded them to outmanoeuvre Paul, both are cowed in a 
decisive moment of human connection between Paul and the Emperor’s subject, Fenring: “kill 
this upstart for me, the Emperor was saying . . . ‘Do it!’ the Emperor hissed . . . [yet] Fenring, 
reading Paul’s emotion, said, ‘Majesty, I must refuse” (Herbert 791). 
In light of the synthesis and rejection of superior technology in Dune, Dick’s Do Androids 
Dream of Electric Sheep (1968) is far more overt in how it undermines technoidealism in favour 
of dystopia. Though Foundations and Dune alike are set against the backdrop of a decaying 
empire and the steady march toward a new established order, Rick Deckard’s harrowing 
encounters with synthetic life depart from this schema to whole-heartedly embrace a dystopian 
undercurrent not seen in these other texts. Though it may be tempting to initially assign this 
dystopian element entirely to the proliferation of science, it is important to complicate such an 
understanding. It is the actions of humans choice and certain developments, not science in and 
of itself, which provides the overarching background for the novel; Earth may be cloaked in 
“radioactive fallout,” but the opportunity to emigrate to a new and better world remains an option 
that those steadfastly remaining deny: “the U.N. had made it easy to emigrate, difficult if not 
impossible to stay . . . And yet persons here and there declined to migrate; that, even to those 
involved, constituted a perplexing irrationality” (Dick 16). This is an irrationality driven not just by 
personal choice but one fomented by the background conditions of a radioactive planet. 
In the case of John Isidore, for instance, his genetic purity is a question which precludes 
any meaningful desire to emigrate. Bitterly watching a broadcast from the new-fangled colony 
on Mars, the recognition that he is a “special” not only due to his “distorted genes” but due to his 
“[failure] to pass the minimum faculties test” puts him in the exceptional position of social 
ostracization: “upon him the contempt of three planets descended” (18). With this in mind, it is 
important to view the text as fundamentally focused on a certain segment of society, a sub-
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element. The importance of this observation bears two important distinctions: one, that there is 
a stratification of society and thereby technology; and two, the technoidealistic concept is 
degraded through this portrayal of selective, not holistic, uplift. This degradation is established 
primarily through a divide between the scientific and social realms. By establishing two variant 
groups, Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep endorses a view that technology is not in and of 
itself a utopian marker, as is the case with technoidealism, but instead endorses Hall’s view that 
“technology facilitates the production of [a] culture” which may or may not be utopian: “utopian 
potential can always be found in culture” yet is not necessarily found in technology or science 
itself (Hall 63). Herein Kumar is in dialectical agreement, noting that this shift is further mirrored 
in the appetites of the post-war period up to the late 70’s, with much of the “large-scale social 
speculation being in a decidedly antiutopian phase” (Kumar 561). In light of this anti-utopianism, 
it may be tempting to claim that the technoidealism, as espoused in Foundations, sees its total 
breakdown in Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep. The text, however, presents a far more 
complicated and nuanced view of the sciences. 
Where this nuance is found is with the introduction of the replicant: a figure central to the 
narrative of the story and also to the human-science relationship. It is tempting to situate the 
replicant as an entity which calls into question the fundamentals of what it means to be human 
or to misconstrue the mechanical as being human. However, this fundamentally ignores the 
mechanical nature of the replicant in the novel; the introductory truth offered by Rick Deckard in 
an exchange with Rachael Rosen, troubling though it may be, is not far from the reality of the 
matter: “a humanoid robot is like any other machine; it can fluctuate between being a benefit 
and a hazard very rapidly” (Dick 38). As already established, the cultural and social interactions 
of a given technology, rather than the technology itself, is responsible for the creation of utopic 
or dystopic outcomes. This principle is also neatly packaged into Deckard’s statement: the 
machine itself is not what is at issue, the issue is its capacity to oscillate in its production of 
social value. Like in Dune, there is a synthesis between the human and scientific element going 
on here. However, whereas in Dune a measure of equilibrium had been achieved, the joinder 
between science and the human—as purportedly contained by the replicant—is of a different 
kind. 
Rather than a symbiotic relationship, the technoidealist mantra is corrupted into 
something that oscillates between mutualism and parasitism. The replicant is demonstrated to 
be a machine animated by an “artificial life force” and a set of inhibitions—inhibitions which, as 
is the case with Luba Luft, can be shed “with appalling abruptness” (123). This particular 
product of science is not an inherently negative entity so much as it is an inherently dangerous 
one. The replicant—being an entity with machine thoughts and machine values—is a realized 
manifestation of a disjuncture in the technoidealist human-science accord. Rather than 
humanity and science being contained within a principle entity, such as the guiding hand of 
psychohistory or the figure of Paul Atreides, the replicant exists as an irreconcilable 
displacement of science in this standard paradigm: science is manifested as a distinct entity that 
is separate from, rather than synthesized with, the human. This is best captured in the ‘murder’ 
of Rick Deckard’s electric nubian goat. While it is tempting to read Rachael Rosen’s murder of 
the nubian goat as vindictive or wholly human, there is a far more mechanical calculation being 
made. Turning to an earlier remark, Rachael delineates Deckard’s various loves on a numerical 
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probably. First the goat, then your wife, then last of all—’” (185). By destroying the goat then, 
Rachael effectively moves up this order. Utilizing a non-empathic and base level assessment, 
bumping off the goat moves her from second to last to second to first. In this view, science has 
not only become increasingly disjointed from its technoidealistic origin but is actively participant 
in fomenting an upset of human social orders through unempathetic interventions. 
4. Science as Suspect 
These are the new dark ages, yes? Civil war, the erosion of 
authority, the breakup of the System, Marin’s destruction--you 
have seen the state of the world. Chaos. Fragmented culture. The 
complete collapse of the manufacturing base . . . All it took was 
destabilization of one aspect of the chain and everything comes 
down, yes? 
—Jeff Somers, The Final Evolution, 2011. 
 
Whereas the former texts called the tenets of technoidealism into question, preferring instead 
synthesis with or interrogation of the human-science relationship, Jeff Somers’ The Final 
Evolution—a culmination of his Avery Cates series—directly supplants technoidealism by 
portraying science as a weapon of mass repression. Society has deteriorated to a set of inter-
factional conflicts between militant groups and police states, cannibals proliferate, and the 
destructive scanning and translation of people into avatars—digital constructs manifested as 
synthetic replicants—abound: gone is the utopian impulse presented by technoidealism. What 
remains, as Kumar posits, is a predilection for the “‘imagination of disaster,’” a preference which 
“fares infinitely better . . . [and enables] dystopia [to] [continue] to flourish” at the expense of 
utopic imaginings (555). The epigraphical remark best captures this, pointing to the fragility of 
the human system under the unrelenting march of technological progress. Though this is a 
society in which humans can become augmented or theoretically immortal, these advancements 
only make humans increasingly vulnerable to the predatory interests of other groups—such as 
through the advent of biohacking: “I had a sudden memory flash . . . to a girl with glowing blue 
eyes apologizing because she’d been hacked . . . hacked by Techies the same way circuits had 
been hacked for decades” (Somers 162). Even considerable achievements, such as the ability 
to implant psionics and expand the potential of the human mind, merely open up new doorways 
to manipulation: “the God Augment . . . Have a technical surgeon implant that into your brain 
and supposedly it gave you all the Psionic powers that people were sometimes born with--
telekinesis, compulsion—and some that no one had documented in the wild” (72; emphasis 
added). Rather than science existing as a mechanism to benefit humanity, it is a tool utilized to 
foment and amplify the worst elements of humanity: avarice, greed, and control. 
While this is something that was witnessed in Dune via CHOAM or Do Androids Dream 
of Electric Sheep with the Rosin Corporation, The Final Evolution uniquely situates itself by 
cementing its protagonist, Avery Cates, as an unabashed antihero. Cates exists as little more 
than a self-concerned mercenary who, when dealt a bad hand, wants nothing more than 
revenge. Whereas Paul Atreides embodies a human-science synthesis and Rick Deckard 
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destructive technology with few considerations: “my HUD spiked sharp and clear in my vision, 
all the bars flashing red as I twisted myself aside. I snapped the Roon up and had it on him for a 
second, but hesitated. Salgado’s voice pinching me . . . ‘Sweet hell, Avery, . . . You’re afraid of 
killing innocents now? . . . You kill everybody, boyo. It’s your damn calling card.’” (198). With this 
element in focus, Schmeink’s assertion that within “posthumanism lies not just the utopian 
dream of a new evolutionary step but also the potential for a dystopian nightmare” not only sees 
its realization but a direct manifestation of this terror (35). 
Such is this manifestation that human selfishness is expounded upon to the extent that 
Cates, in a decisive moment where the fate of the world hangs in the balance, rejects a 
humanity controlled and driven by science. Faced with a decision wherein he can relinquish his 
quest for vengeance to allow the man—now a god-like entity thanks to Avatar technology—to 
potentially restore the world to a cohesive state, Cates opts to reject this outcome in favour of a 
‘human’ solution: “the cold, numb feeling from my arm seemed to spread rapidly . . . settling in 
and removing all the fire, the pain, and leaving behind just an empty certainty. I thought, Avery 
Cates, Destroyer of Worlds and pulled the trigger” (Somers 355). In a rather grim twist, a 
technology-driven solution is rejected to such an extent that the human element would sooner 
see its final and total erasure rather than embrace a science-oriented solution; science no 
longer resolves problems but foments them: it is a virulent creation that demands destruction 
even at the cost of destroying its creators wholesale. 
Though not as dramatic as the resolution of Somers’ series, Reid’s Foe nonetheless 
participates in the contemporary swerve away from technoidealism vis-a-vis its exploration of 
the synthetic human: a ‘replacement’ entity created to temporarily socially replace someone 
while they work in outer space. Regardless of what term is used, replacement, replicant, 
synthetic, etcetera, what is clear is that Foe is focused on a sinister undercurrent. Whereas 
Dick’s replicants are flawed or still clearly mechanical entities in some capacity and Somers’ 
avatars are digitized human psyches, Reid’s replacement is a biologically derived entity with a 
capacity to develop genuine human experiences. Though it may at first be tempting to see the 
replacement as a sort of analogue to the synthesis in Dune or a separation of the scientific body 
as in Do Android’s Dream of Electric Sheep, Foe is unique in its experiential exploration of the 
replacement. Rather than establish the replacement as an outsider imposition, the replacement 
himself is the central character. Furthermore, this replacement is conned into believing he is the 
true human entity in question. His assistance in a series of exercises to purportedly produce a 
replacement of his own is, in truth, merely monitoring for feedback as one would with an 
experiment: “what’s it like? This thing that will be here that’s supposed to take my place? That’s 
going to live with Hen . . . ‘It’s not going to take your place, exactly, just hold it, like a substitute 
teacher’ [replied Terrance]” (Reid 151). This trickery is not just played at the level of dialogue 
but is also an integral part of the plot’s primary twist—the readership is led on to believe that the 
replacement is the real Junior for much of the novel. Functionally, this serves to achieve two 
things; not only does it situate the replacement in a uniquely human context, but it creates a 
serious ethical and moral quandary on the status of scientifically derived entities in relation to 
natural ones. 
Whereas earlier incarnations captured in technoidealism—especially in the case of 
Foundations and Dune—followed Clayton’s standard science-fiction convention of “[aspiring] to 
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the science in directly human form (Clayton 338). This is not an issue of a prophesied outcome, 
but a philosophical quandary about the ethics of a created human. This quandary, in turn, is one 
born from the implications that a true human-level intelligence has been created and 
transplanted with a false set of memories and identity: if the experiential, empathic, and affective 
qualities don’t differ, are both Juniors not uniquely human entities? The replacement himself 
unwittingly remarks on the deferential treatment afforded to him, viewing his current position as 
an inhumane imposition: “this feeling has been growing since Terrance entered our lives . . . 
Why am I allowing him to control me? I’m still in my house. I haven’t gone anywhere yet. I 
should have seen this before. Now it’s all I can see” (203). He has been reduced to little more 
than the subject of prodding interrogations and data collections by the company who, 
unbeknownst to him, created him. Junior, though he is but a prototype for future replacements, 
is in many ways more remarkably human than those surrounding him. 
The question of liberty is particularly pointed as the reveal of Junior’s scientifically 
derived nature has not yet been uncovered. For all intents and purposes, the intercessions of 
OuterMore at this stage appear to constitute a breach of Junior’s fundamental right to privacy. In 
relation to technoidealism, however, this also presents a fundamental breakdown in the notion 
that science can serve as a guiding and positivist principle: there is no longer any trace of the 
original technoidealist mantra. Rather than being a tool to reduce human suffering or “remedy 
the situation . . . [and] restore peace and civilization,” science is uniquely situated in Foe as the 
very source which promulgates human suffering vis-a-vis unethical conduct (Second Foundation 
3). Not only is this basic truth captured with the existence of the replacement Junior, but it’s also 
tightly bound up in the fact that the replacement Junior is in some ways more distinctly human 
than the real one. This is expressed clearly through his interactions with Hen which, upon the 
replacement’s destruction and the reinstitution of the ‘real’ Junior, are immediately 
countermanded by her reduction to the object of wife: “I won’t leave you again. Imagine if you’d 
heard about this as a little girl--that one day you would have a part in helping your man do 
something incredible, be part of something historic” (Reid 240). In a peculiar parallelism, the 
replacement Junior is treated as an object yet expresses empathy, whereas the real Junior is a 
realized human who does not: he ascribes his wife’s value as the sum of his own achievements. 
Effectively, the inhuman becomes human and the human becomes inhuman. Science, rather 
than offering a solution, has curiously delegitimized humanity instead. 
5. Conclusion 
 
It can’t be real. It’s impossible. This can’t be happening. But it is. 
There’s no mistaking it. It’s here. It looks so real. Not artificial, not 
manufactured. Lifelike in every way. Standing in my house. It’s 
me, standing at my door, looking at me. The replacement. My 
replacement. 
—Iain Reid, Foe, 2018 
 
What remains in the wake of this shift? Like the epigraph which captures and embodies the 
anxieties of Junior in manifest form, so too has the concept of technoidealism been replaced in 
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perceived original, through its purported want of realism, but it also highlights an interesting 
parallel between these two approaches. In abandoning the high-idealism of the science fiction 
genre, what has been necessarily left behind? In mapping this genre-oriented conception onto 
this epigraph, technoidealism is consigned as a prototype for something as of yet unrealized. 
From the view of Kumar, what is lost in the exchange of utopia for dystopia is the primary 
vehicle for the “hopes, aspirations, and schemes for humanity . . . [and] the principal way of 
attempting to tame the future” (564). The turn away from technoidealism in essence not only 
reflects a growing concern that science plays in the role of mediating human experience but 
also a loss of appetite for the former primacy of utopian narrative and positivist idealism. It is 
clear that science and the prospects of technology are to remain an integral component of the 
literary experience of science-fiction, but that the notion of scientifically driven uplift has become 
dated. 
 This inference is perhaps what is embodied in Asimov’s earlier complaints regarding the 
deletion of science from the genre. Rather than understanding this statement as a literal remark 
about the ‘low-science’ predilections of authors such as Herbert, what is encapsulated in 
Asimov’s concern is a drift away from the technoidealist corpus he painstakingly established: it 
is not the lack of science which is of concern, but the divorce of idealism from it. In this vein, 
these earlier polemics are mildly prophetic in their own right. Technoidealism, the conception of 
science and technology as a guiding hand for humanity’s future, has experienced a gradual 
downturn spanning from the early 60’s to the cementing of its absence in contemporary works. 
Where in Dune and Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep it found its core tenets being 
interrogated, modified, or interpolated in a more human-oriented capacity, in The Final Evolution 
and Foe it is remarkably absent: the idea of science as a positive force is entirely removed. 
Gone are the “staggering complexities of man-made structures,” the faith in technological 
progress as a principled enterprise, and the promise of science as a panacea to the ills 
fomented by society (Foundation 13). What remains in the wake of these shifts is not the future-
hopeful conceptions of technoidealism. Instead, what survives is a discourse grounded in the 
hard realities, where science and technology are all too often not a means to foment social 
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